Threat Intelligence and Cybersecurity Preparedness for Major 2026 Sporting Events

Major sporting events in 2026 – notably the FIFA World Cup hosted across the United States, Canada, and Mexico, as well as the Milano-Cortina Winter Olympics in Italy – present unparalleled cybersecurity challenges - especially as technology is embedded in the very success of althelets and events. These global spectacles face a complex threat landscape spanning cyber attacks, terrorism, fraud, and other criminal activities. Host countries’ intelligence agencies and security forces must coordinate closely with international partners, private sector stakeholders, and event organizers to safeguard smart stadiums, digital platforms, and the millions of attendees. This report analyzes the 2026 event threat landscape, profiles host nation preparedness, compares national risk tolerance and cyber maturity, and examines the role of international bodies in fostering intelligence-sharing and resilience. Actionable recommendations are provided for decision-makers in intelligence, law enforcement, and digital infrastructure protection.

High-Profile Targets

Global sporting events draw intense cyber activity from a range of threat actors. Cybercriminals, state-sponsored hackers, and hacktivists are all very likely to target event infrastructure, participants, and audiences for profit or propaganda. The sheer scale and visibility of the 2026 tournaments – the largest World Cup ever with 48 teams in 16 cities and a widespread Winter Olympics – amplify the appeal for attackers. As these threats exist for every major game, but at World Cup scale “it’s just compounded" with vulnerablitie in technology integration.

Criminal groups are expected to pursue financially motivated attacks against event organizers, sponsors, and service providers. Large organizations involved in the World Cup or Olympics generate valuable personal and financial data that criminals can steal or hold for ransom. Ransomware attacks have previously hit sports targets – for example, a UK football club’s network was crippled and its turnstiles knocked offline by a 2020 ransomware incident. With so much depending on digital ticketing, broadcasting, and venue operations, a well-timed ransomware attack could disrupt event services and pressure victims into paying. Attackers may also target smaller vendors (hotels, transport companies) near events for extortion, knowing they handle more customer data and traffic during the event.

Sophisticated fraud schemes are another concern. Threat actors may infiltrate communications of sports organizations to divert payments – as happened when cybercriminals spear-phished a Premier League club’s director and almost redirected a £1 million transfer. The expanded supply chain around events (sponsors, construction, hospitality) offers many points of entry for scammers to steal funds or data.

Attendees and fans will be aggressively targeted with themed phishing lures and fake websites. Past Olympics saw attackers create malicious streaming sites and fake schedule pages that trick users into entering personal info or downloading malware. For 2026, threat researchers have already observed a surge of fraudulent domains referencing “FIFA 2026” and host cities. These domains are being stockpiled to host counterfeit ticket scams, “free livestream” malware traps, and fake merchandise shops. Many are registered in bulk bursts and share infrastructure, indicating organized campaigns gearing up. Social media and messaging apps are expected to amplify these scams by directing fans to the malicious sites. Perhaps most alarming, evidence suggests botnets are being readied to attack official ticketing systems, flooding ticket purchase queues to hoard tickets for resale and even manipulating dynamic pricing algorithms. Dark web forums already offer “scalper” bot kits and proxy services tailored to FIFA’s ticketing platform. Such abuse could deny legitimate fans access and strain ticketing infrastructure – a risk highlighted by a recent U.S. lawsuit against Ticketmaster for bot-driven market manipulation.

Hacktivism, State-Sponsored Espionage and Disruption

High-profile events offer a global stage for hacktivists to promote political or social causes. Intelligence assessments warn that hacktivist groups will likely conduct website defacements, DDoS attacks, and hack-and-leak operations against event target. The motivation can range from domestic grievances to international issues. For example, Anonymous launched DDoS and data-leak attacks during Brazil’s 2014 World Cup and 2016 Rio Olympics to protest government policies. Leading up to Paris 2024, French support for Ukraine and domestic unrest over pension reforms made French systems a hacktivist target. By 2026, the highly polarized political landscape (e.g. geopolitical conflicts, human rights issues) is expected to energize more hacktivist action. Indeed, the IOC has flagged how global conflicts (such as the Israel–Hamas war) have triggered protest disruptions of sporting events, underscoring the need to brace for activism spilling into World Cup or Olympic venues.

Intelligence agencies anticipate that nation-state cyber actors will covertly target 2026 events, though primarily for espionage and influence rather than overt disruption. Major events attract dignitaries, government officials, corporate leaders, and anti-doping authorities – all juicy targets for intelligence collection. Past Olympics saw state-backed hackers infiltrate hotel networks used by Olympic officials to steal sensitive data. There is also precedent for state-sponsored retaliation via cyber attack: for example, Russian hackers unleashed a disruptive malware attack on the 2018 Pyeong Chang Winter Olympics opening ceremony - knocking out the official website and stadium Wi-Fi - as revenge for Russia’s doping ban. In 2026, Russia’s continued exclusion from many sports over the Ukraine war and doping sanctions raises the possibility of cyber retaliation, and an “even chance” of Russian cyber disruption attempts against high-profile events. More broadly, while no specific state plots have been identified at this time, the volatile geopolitical climate means disruptive attacks cannot be ruled out if a nation sees an opportunity to embarrass a host country or make a political statement on the world stage.

Traditional terror and crime threats remain a concern (e.g. terrorism, violent protests, drone attacks, hooliganism). These often intertwine with cyber elements – for instance, terrorists might attempt to jam communications or spread disinformation during an attack, and criminals could hack smart stadium systems to facilitate theft. Canadian organizers of World Cup matches explicitly cite terrorism, hacking, protest blockades, drone attacks, and vehicle ramming as key security risks being assessed. Recent incidents underscore the danger: in 2023 a vehicle ramming in Vancouver killed 11 people at a festival, and in 2024 environmental activists disrupted sporting events in Europe (like the Tour of Spain) to draw attention to their causes.

Host nations in 2026 must prepare for such multifaceted threats, where cyber and physical tactics may be used in combination.

Analysing Host Country's Intelligence Agency Postures

Each host nation of the 2026 tournaments is bolstering its intelligence and security posture to mitigate cyber and physical threats to sports venues, smart infrastructure, and the visiting public. The United States, Canada, and Mexico – co-hosts of the World Cup – have varying levels of cybersecurity maturity and risk tolerance, but are coordinating efforts. Italy, as host of the 2026 Winter Olympics, similarly is mobilizing its security agencies and technological defenses.

United States: “Whole-of-Government” Security and Cyber Defense

The U.S. is treating the 2026 FIFA World Cup as a National Special Security Event (NSSE), reflecting a zero-fail mentality for securing what will be the largest sporting event in American history. A White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup 2026 has been established to coordinate whole-of-government preparation. Senior officials describe an unprecedented interagency effort spanning intelligence, law enforcement, defense, transportation and other critical infrastructures.

Over $1 billion in federal security funding has been approved for World Cup. This supports hardening stadium perimeters, deploying multiple layers of screening, beefing up emergency response, and counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) measures against rogue drones. The Department of Homeland Security and FEMA are channeling grants to all 11 U.S. host cities for training exercises, cybersecurity defenses, and surge law enforcement. Such resources aim to make World Cup venues as secure as Super Bowl-level events, with robust access control and crowd protection. U.S. intelligence agencies (FBI, DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis, CIA, NSA, etc.) are fully integrated into event security planning. The FBI – as both a law enforcement and domestic intelligence body – is using its intelligence-driven approach to monitor threat indicators (from terrorist plots to cybercriminal chatter) and push out actionable warnings. To enhance real-time information sharing, the FBI and DHS are standing up an International Police Cooperation Center (IPCC) for the World Cup. Modeled on successful centers at recent World Cups, this IPCC will colocate liaison officers from participating countries’ police forces and enable rapid sharing of threat intel, criminal watch-list information, and incident reports across borders. Such coordination is vital for a tri-national event – as one expert noted, if U.S. agencies receive a classified threat, they need a mechanism “to rapidly communicate that threat in a secure manner to two different countries at the same time. Tabletop exercises are being conducted to rehearse cross-border communication flows in the event of a credible threat in the cyber or kinetic.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within DHS is leading efforts to secure critical infrastructure supporting the World Cup – from stadium operational technology to transportation and power grids. Recognizing the technology-heavy nature of modern venues, U.S. officials are working to “bake in” cybersecurity measures well ahead of the events. This includes comprehensive vulnerability assessments of smart stadium systems, network monitoring during events, and incident response plans for cyber disruptions. Notably, DHS grants are funding counter-drone technology and training, addressing the rising risk of weaponized or intrusive drones over stadiums. Water and energy utilities serving host cities are also on alert – areas sometimes overlooked in sports event planning but deemed critical for a dispersed event of this magnitute. Learning from past events (e.g. Tokyo 2021, Paris 2024), U.S. cyber teams are incorporating “lessons learned” into daily operations now, so that best practices are second nature by 2026. The outlook among U.S. cyber strategists is cautiously optimistic: thanks to ongoing improvements in exercises and infrastructure security, the country will be “much better” prepared to handle World Cup cyber threats as they arise.

Overall, the U.S. is leveraging its considerable resources and experience from past NSSEs (e.g. presidential inaugurations, the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, etc.) to ensure a “biggest, safest, most extraordinary” World Cup. The approach pairs strong security measures with a welcoming fan experience, according to the White House task force director. Intelligence agencies are on high alert but confident that proactive planning will reduce the likelihood of surprise threats.

Canada: Integrated Security Units and Protective Intelligence

Canada, hosting a subset of World Cup 2026 matches (in Toronto and Vancouver), is likewise mobilizing its intelligence and security community, albeit on a smaller scale and budget than the U.S. Canadian officials view 2026 as the country’s biggest global sporting operation since the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics.

Integrated Safety & Security Unit (ISSU)

Building on the Olympic experience, Canada is expected to stand up integrated multi-agency command units for the World Cup cities. These units bring together the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (federal police), provincial and municipal police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS – Canada’s domestic intelligence agency), Public Safety Canada (the federal ministry overseeing security), border security (CBSA), and other partners. In Vancouver, an “integrated safety and security unit” with representatives from 18 agencies (police, fire, medical, emergency management, etc.) is already in planning. Such units coordinate everything from tactical response to cybersecurity to dignitary protection.

Canadian planners have identified several high-level threats to guard against: terrorism, cyber attacks (“hacking”), civil disorder/protests, drone threats, and vehicular attacks. The RCMP-led protective intelligence teams will watch for any terrorist or extremist indicators, including monitoring online spaces for threat chatter. Drone mitigation strategies are being formulated (leveraging RCMP and Canadian Armed Forces expertise in C-UAS). Critical infrastructure around venues (power, transit, telecom) is being assessed for vulnerabilities by the Cyber Centre and partners. There is also an emphasis on avoiding the cost overruns of 2010’s Olympics security (which came in at $900 million vs an initial $175M estimate) – hence the push for efficiency and multi-purpose use of personnel and technology.

As a co-host, Canada is working closely with U.S. and Mexican counterparts. Joint security planning meetings have been held under the World Cup coordinating framework. Canadian officials regularly participate in INTERPOL Project Stadia workshops to glean best practices from other countries’ experiences. Information sharing with U.S. agencies is facilitated by existing Five Eyes intelligence relationships – for example, CSIS and the FBI exchanging intel on terrorism or cyber threats to World Cup events. At the operational level, Canada will contribute officers to the U.S.-based IPCC center and may host a sub-center when matches occur on Canadian soil, to ensure seamless info flow between nations.

In summary, Canada’s intelligence and security apparatus is approaching the World Cup with cautious pragmatism. The country benefits from strong baseline cybersecurity and counterterrorism capabilities (it ranks highly in global cyber readiness indexes), but it must stretch those resources to cover the events. The risk tolerance is balanced – Canada seeks to minimize disruptions and threats, yet is mindful of not overspending absent concrete threats. The successful security record of Vancouver 2010 and lessons since then put Canada in a good position to secure its 2026 events, provided intergovernmental coordination gaps (like finalizing federal-provincial roles) are resolved well before kickoff.

Mexico: Strengthening Security Architecture and Technology Integration

Mexico’s role as co-host is under intense scrutiny, as it will host matches in cities like Guadalajara, Mexico City, Monterrey that face their own security challenges. Mexican authorities view the World Cup as an opportunity to showcase improvements in public safety and are aligning preparations with national security strategy goals.

National Guard and Intelligence Enhancement

Mexico is leveraging its National Guard (Guardia Nacional) – a federal security force created in recent years – as a central component of World Cup security. The event aligns with Mexico’s National Public Security Strategy pillars to strengthen intelligence and investigation and consolidate the National Guard as a reliable force. Intelligence units under CISEN’s successor (the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI) are expected to intensify monitoring of organized crime groups, extremist threats, and any indication of plots against the event. Given Mexico’s primary security issue is organized crime, an emphasis is on ensuring cartels or criminal gangs do not exploit the World Cup (for instance, for high-profile kidnappings, extortion, or trafficking). The risk tolerance here is tricky – Mexico cannot overnight eliminate endemic crime, but it aims to ring-fence the event venues and visitors with a strong security presence. Reports indicate roughly 50,000 police and security personnel will be deployed across Mexico’s World Cup operationshealix.com. The Mexican Army and Marines will likely support local police for counterterrorism and emergency response, as they did for past large events like the 1968 Olympics and 1986 World Cup.

Smart Stadiums

Mexican authorities are embracing AI-powered surveillance and unified communications to compensate for manpower and surveillance gaps . Stadiums and fan zones will be outfitted with intelligent video security – high-definition CCTV cameras augmented with real-time analytics to detect suspicious behaviors or recognize known threat actors. This proactive video monitoring can flag potential issues (e.g. a bag left unattended, or a known hooligan entering) and drastically cut response time. Police and emergency responders are being equipped with body-worn cameras, which provide transparency and additional situational awareness during incidentsmexicobusiness.news. On the communications side, Mexico is investing in interoperable radio networks (e.g. P25 standard systems) to ensure all responders – police, fire, medical, private security – can communicate even if commercial cell networks become overloaded. Such unified communication is crucial given Mexico’s need to coordinate among various agencies and even across state lines, and it directly supports the goal of improving inter-agency cooperation.

Mexico is setting up central command centers for the event that integrate data from cameras, sensors, emergency calls, and field reports. These cloud-based command and control centers act as “the brain of operations,” performing data fusion and analytics to give commanders a live common operating picture. For example, if a disturbance occurs, commanders can see CCTV feeds, track unit locations, and manage the response from one hub. Mexican cyber units -under the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection- will monitor for cyber threats to critical systems. Notably, Mexico’s Federal Police cyber division which is now within the National Guard structure has experience from securing events like the Pan-American Games. They will work to protect ticketing systems, payment platforms, and public information channels from hacking or defacement. In partnership with the national cybersecurity agency -which Mexico has been developing, they aim to harden the technological infrastructure of the Games – an effort reinforced by international support. For instance, Italy’s cyber agency (ACN) has signed agreements to assist the Milano-Cortina Olympics; similarly, the North American hosts are likely sharing cyber threat intelligence with each other and receiving guidance from companies like Motorola Solutions (whose local VP has been advising on technology best practices.

In essence, Mexico’s approach is a comprehensive security strategy blending manpower, intelligence, and tech integration. It sees the World Cup as a chance to demonstrate improved public safety capabilities. While Mexico’s cybersecurity maturity has historically lagged behind the U.S. and Canada, the country is rapidly upgrading its digital defenses for the event. Its risk tolerance is perhaps unavoidably higher – certain background risks (like generalized crime) cannot be fully eliminated – yet Mexican authorities are focused on preventing any major incident that would mar the nation’s image. Success will hinge on disciplined coordination among agencies and robust support from international partners.

Italy: Winter Olympics 2026 Security and Intelligence Coordination

Although not a World Cup host, Italy’s Milano-Cortina 2026 Winter Olympics is another major 2026 sporting event requiring intensive threat preparedness. Spread across multiple northern Italian venues in February 2026, these Games introduce challenges of geographic dispersion and alpine security on top of typical Olympic threats.

Italy is leveraging its specialist law enforcement units such as the Polizia Postale (Postal Police) – which handles cybercrime – to secure the Olympics’ digital footprint. An agreement between the Postal Police and the Milano Cortina Foundation outlines joint efforts in defining response procedures to cyber incidents and protecting critical networks during the Games. The organizing committee is also working closely with telecom providers to guarantee secure communications across venues in mountainous regions, and with power companies to ensure reliable electricity (given winter conditions). Following the example of Paris 2024 (which introduced AI-enhanced video surveillance for crowd security, Italy is considering similar smart surveillance systems under strict legal oversight.

Italian security services are coordinating with INTERPOL and Europol to gather intelligence on individuals or groups that might target the Games. Special event security units (known as UOPI within the Carabinieri) will be deployed for rapid response to any incidents, and Italy’s military will provide air defense and C-UAS coverage (a standard procedure since the 2006 Turin Olympics). In line with international efforts, Italy is also focusing on integrity threats like match-fixing, illegal betting, and corruption. A Joint Integrity Unit has been formed for Milano-Cortina 2026, involving the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI), law enforcement, and betting regulators. Its role is to monitor for any betting irregularities and competition manipulation. This mirrors IOC’s overall integrity measures, where the Olympic Movement Unit on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions (OM Unit PMC) works with partners like INTERPOL, the International Betting Integrity Association, and others to share intelligence on betting fraud ahead of the Games. These efforts contribute to digital resilience by ensuring that criminal exploitation (through cyber means or otherwise) of the Games’ competitive aspects is minimized.

They also recognize the importance of balancing security and the celebratory spirit of the Games, striving for a secure yet open event.

The differences in cybersecurity maturity levels underline the importance of coordination – each nation must trust and assist the others to ensure no weak link is left for adversaries to exploit. Fortunately, ongoing trilateral planning indicates recognition of this fact.

Role of International Organizations in Threat Intelligence and Resilience

International organizations play a crucial role in unifying efforts and sharing knowledge to secure the 2026 events. Through its Project Stadia, INTERPOL has become a central hub for major event security cooperation. Funded originally by Qatar and now spanning 70 countries, Project Stadia creates a “centre of excellence” for major event security, offering databases of best practices and training programs for host countries. INTERPOL coordinates an international network of experts in event policing, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and legislation to advise hosts. Notably, INTERPOL deploys a Major Events Support Team / Joint Task Force (JTF) to assist host nations. This JTF provides a single point of contact to access all INTERPOL capabilities, from real-time databases (e.g. stolen passports, terrorist watchlists) to analytical support. The JTF concept proved valuable at the Qatar 2022 World Cup and was used for the Paris 2024 Olympics, where INTERPOL officers on-site and virtually delivered comprehensive intelligence packages and cyber-focused monitoring to French law enforcement. For 2026, INTERPOL will likely have JTF deployments in the U.S./Canada/Mexico and Italy, ensuring that critical international threat intelligence (such as alerts on terrorist movements or cyber plots spanning countries) is shared swiftly with host agencies. INTERPOL also helps hosts set up their International Police Cooperation Centers (IPCC) – as seen in 2022 and planned in 2026 – which physically embed foreign liaison officers to manage visiting fan security and cross-border info sharing. In essence, INTERPOL acts as a force multiplier for host intelligence efforts, bringing global reach and databases to local security operations.

Role of FIFA and International Olympic Committee

The governing body of world football has a vested interest in a secure World Cup and contributes mainly in coordination and integrity domains. FIFA’s Security Department and Chief Safety & Security Officer (for 2026, Helmut Spahn and team) are working closely with host country authorities to set security requirements and standards. FIFA helps facilitate data sharing on hooliganism through the National Football Information Point (NFIP) network – a mechanism used in previous World Cups to share info on high-risk fans between countries. FIFA is also part of public communications to fans about safety (e.g. encouraging use of official ticketing). In terms of cyber, FIFA’s IT teams coordinate with hosts on securing ticketing platforms and event management systems. A notable risk area is ticketing infrastructure, and threat intel from private firms suggests botnets and fraud could target FIFA’s own systems. FIFA works with cybersecurity partners and possibly INTERPOL to detect and mitigate such threats, as the reputation of the tournament is at stake. At a strategic level, FIFA has welcomed the formation of the White House Task Force and similar initiatives, offering support and expertise.

Additionally, FIFA runs educational programs for players and staff on cybersecurity hygiene (to prevent phishing of teams, etc.) in collaboration with organizations like the IOC and INTERPOL.

Ahead of Milano-Cortina 2026, the IOC announced enhanced integrity measures, with its OM Unit PMC (Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions) leading intelligence efforts on betting fraud, supported by partners like the International Betting Integrity Association and United Lotteries for Integrity in Sports. On physical/cyber security, the IOC’s Olympic Security Coordination Office likely shares lessons from Tokyo 2021 and Beijing 2022 (which had to contend with COVID and cyber issues) with the Italian organizers. The IOC also serves as a convener for international security briefings – for instance, in late 2024, an International Security Briefing in Milan brought together law enforcement from various countries to discuss Olympic safety.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contributes primarily through its Safeguarding Sport initiatives, which focus on combating corruption, organized crime, and terrorism around sports. UNODC, in partnership with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and others, has a Global Programme on Security of Major Sporting Events aimed at helping member states protect events from terrorist threats and crime. They produce best-practice guides and facilitate capacity-building. For instance, UNODC/UNOCT and the International Centre for Sport Security released a Global Guide on Major Event Security to inform policymakers on evolving threats (cybercrime, use of drones, etc.) and preventive strategies. UNODC also tackles competition manipulation and illegal betting, which indirectly boosts security by reducing incentives for criminal syndicates to target events. Through conferences and task forces, UNODC helps countries like Mexico – which faces organized crime influence in sports – to share intel on cross-border betting fraud and match-fixing rings. Another UN aspect is using sport to prevent extremism: programs that engage youth and communities in sport can reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies, complementing hard security measures. While these are long-term efforts, they underscore the UN’s holistic approach to safe sports events.

Organizations like Europol in the EU and the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Americas also contribute within their regions. Europol often stands up an international coordination center for events in Europe (e.g. supporting France’s security for Euro 2016, etc.) and will likely assist Italy 2026, especially on counter-terror and hooligan intelligence within Europe. The OAS has worked with UNOCT on raising awareness of sports event terrorism threats in the Americas, which can feed into how the U.S., Canada, and Mexico prepare. Additionally, the International Criminal Police Organization’s Integrity in Sport initiative (joint IOC-INTERPOL venture) helps with training law enforcement to detect and investigate sport-related crimes, ensuring those skills are fresh for 2026.

International bodies thus act as force multipliers and information brokers. They help standardize preparedness, ensure no country is going it alone against transnational threats, and provide specialized tools (like databases of known fixers or terrorists). By 2026, this network of organizations aims to foster a climate of collective security around the events – an attack on one host is treated as a threat to all, met with coordinated response and solidarity.

Public-Private Intelligence Coordination and Supply Chain Security

Protecting mega-events is not solely a government endeavor – it requires robust public-private collaboration. Smart Stadium Vendors and Infrastructure: Modern stadiums rely on countless private suppliers – from building management systems and turnstiles to giant screens and cashless payment systems. A breach in any vendor’s product could become an entry point for attackers. Thus, intelligence agencies and cybersecurity units are working closely with private vendors to audit and secure the supply chain. For example, in Qatar 2022 a compromised network router was discovered that could have been used to disrupt communications and streaming services during the World Cup. This illustrates the risk from third-party equipment. Ahead of 2026, hosts are likely mandating strict cybersecurity standards for all technology providers, basic ones being up-to-date firmware, no default passwords, penetration testing of solution. Many vendors participate in information sharing forums with agencies like CISA or the Canadian Cyber Centre, exchanging threat intelligence about potential attacks on critical event tech. On site, companies like electricity providers and telecom operators embed liaison staff in event command centers to enable rapid response to outages or cyber incidents affecting their services.

Ticketing and Fan Platforms

Ticketing for World Cup 2026 will be largely digital and handled via official platforms (FIFA’s ticketing system) and authorized resellers. Given the observed campaigns of fake ticket websites and bot attacks on ticket sales, collaboration is needed to protect fans and revenue.

FIFA and host governments are coordinating with domain registrars and web hosting companies to monitor and takedown fraudulent domains purporting to sell tickets. Intelligence from private cybersecurity firms like Check Point’s findings on 4,300+ suspicious domains is being used to flag these scams.

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission and law enforcement have also been cracking down on illegal ticket scalping tools, a domestic action that supports the integrity of World Cup ticketing. Furthermore, companies running ticketing (often outsourced tech firms) are under government guidance to implement anti-bot measures, robust identity verification, and anomaly detection in purchase patterns. Public advisories will encourage fans to only buy through official channels; meanwhile, credit card companies and banks are partnering to detect and block known scam transactions (sharing fraud indicators gleaned from past events).

The broadcasting of these events involves major media networks and online streaming platforms. Disruption to live broadcasts – whether via cyber attack on a broadcaster or widespread DDoS attacks on streaming services – would cause chaos and erode trust. To preempt this, public-private coordination is in play: broadcasters are working with national cyber agencies to harden their content delivery networks, and to plan backup streams.

The global sports betting industry, much of it private or quasi-private, is a critical partner in event security. Betting-related corruption or match manipulation could indirectly lead to security incidents. For example, if organized crime attempts to coerce players or bribe officials, it could spark confrontations or scandals during the event. To guard against this, hosts and international bodies are working with betting operators and integrity firms. For the World Cup, FIFA’s Integrity Unit and INTERPOL coordinate with the International Betting Integrity Association (IBIA), which pools data on suspicious betting worldwide. They will use advanced algorithms to spot any irregular betting patterns on World Cup matches and share that intel immediately with law enforcement for investigation. The Italian Olympics case shows a proactive stance: Italian regulators (ADM) teamed with CONI to create an integrity unit specifically to strengthen betting intelligence-sharing for 2026. In North America, where sports betting is legal in many U.S. states and in Canada, gaming control boards and major sportsbook companies are part of an information-sharing network. They have points of contact with the FBI and RCMP to flag anything nefarious (e.g. large bets that could indicate an insider fix or a cyber compromise of athlete data). This public-private vigilance helps ensure that criminal enterprises do not exploit the Games for illicit profit, thereby preserving fair play and public confidence.

Supply Chain Vetting and Monitoring

The supply chains for merchandise, food, transportation, and even construction for event facilities are potential security weak links. Governments have advised hosts to implement supply chain risk management. This includes vetting suppliers for ties to organized crime or hostile states, ensuring background checks for contractors, like those who will have access to stadium systems, and monitoring for counterfeit goods. INTERPOL and customs agencies like U.S. CBP, Canada Border Services are collaborate to interdict counterfeit World Cup merchandise and tickets, which often fund criminal groups. On the cyber side, the supply chain threat is that attackers may target a smaller vendor to indirectly hit the event (so-called third-party risk). Awareness of this is high – national cyber authorities have warned that threat actors could hack just one software supplier to compromise many victims at once. Thus, hosts are encouraging all partners, down to small businesses, to practice good cyber hygiene and report any incidents.

Overall, public-private coordination is a cornerstone of 2026 event security. Government agencies provide threat intelligence and enforcement muscle, while private entities bring innovation, agility, and on-the-ground operational capability. Both sides benefit: governments get extended eyes and ears, and companies get timely threat information and clear expectations.

Actionable Recommendations for Decision-Makers

In light of the analysis above, the following recommendations are offered to enhance threat intelligence and security preparedness for 2026 sporting events. These actions are aimed at leaders in intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and digital infrastructure protection:

1. Establish Joint Intelligence Task Forces Early: Form dedicated Major Event Intelligence Task Forces that combine analysts from domestic intelligence, cyber agencies, and police intelligence units. These task forces should start working well ahead of the events to map out threat scenarios, continuously scan for indicators (online and human intel), and produce joint assessments. Co-locating representatives from partner countries is crucial – e.g. embed Canadian and Mexican liaisons in the U.S. task force and vice versa. An integrated approach will improve the speed and accuracy of identifying threats that span jurisdictions or domains (cyber/physical).

2. Intensify Cross-Border Info-Sharing Agreements: 2026 hosts should expand intelligence-sharing frameworksspecific to the events. This could mean updating or creating Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the U.S., Canada, Mexico (and Italy for Olympics) to allow direct, real-time exchange of threat data. Use INTERPOL’s IPCC model to station foreign officers in host command centers, ensuring that information like suspect travel data or cyber threat indicators is immediately available to allbusiness. Additionally, work through INTERPOL and UNOCT to get threat insights from other member states (for example, Europe or Asia) about any extremists or cyber actors potentially targeting the events.

3. Harden Critical Infrastructure & Systems Now: Conduct comprehensive security audits and penetration testson all critical systems tied to the events. This includes stadium control systems (HVAC, turnstiles), power supply, telecom networks, transportation management, ticketing platforms, and broadcast systems. Any vulnerabilities discovered should be remediated by early 2025, leaving a safety margin. Require each venue to have an incident response plan for cyber attacks – e.g. how to quickly switch to backup power or manual operations if systems are compromised. Drills should be run simulating a ransomware outage or drone intrusion to test these plans. Ensuring resilience (backup communications, redundant feeds for broadcasts, etc.) will mean that even if attacks occur, the impact is contained.

4. Enhance Public-Private Collaborative Platforms: Set up or reinforce information-sharing platforms like Special Event ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers) specifically for World Cup/Olympics stakeholders. Through these, intelligence agencies can push out threat alerts (e.g. indicators of a phishing campaign or new malware targeting sports bodies) to all relevant companies in real time. Likewise, private firms should have clear channels to report anomalies to authorities. Regular joint briefings and workshops with vendors, sponsors, broadcasters, and betting companies will build trust. A fusion center model – where public and private analysts sit together monitoring threats – could be employed during the events for collective situational awareness.

5. Secure the Digital Fan Experience: Protect fans by preemptively tackling the fraud and scams identified. Launch a public awareness campaign (through media and official channels) warning about fake tickets, fake streaming links, and phishing, complete with tips (e.g. “only download official event apps, beware of too-good-to-be-true ticket offers”). Simultaneously, empower a joint task force of cybercrime units and industry (domain registrars, social media platforms) to rapidly takedown fraudulent domains and social media pages peddling.

6. Rigorous Drills for Complex Attacks: Conduct multi-disciplinary simulation exercises that involve both cyber and physical components. For example, a drill scenario could be: a coordinated cyber attack takes down stadium turnstiles and scoreboard while a drone incident and a bomb threat occur simultaneously. Involve intelligence analysts (to simulate how early warning might come), police tactical units, cybersecurity teams, venue operators, and public communication officers in the exercise. Practice the chain of command – who makes decisions if a match needs to be paused or evacuated, how information flows to the public to prevent panic. Such exercises will expose gaps in coordination and ensure that in a real crisis, responses are swift and unified. Include international partners in some drills to practice cross-border coordination.

7. Implement Strict Supply Chain Security Protocols: Require that every contractor or technology supplier supporting the events adhere to minimum cybersecurity standards. This can be enforced through contracts: mandate measures like background checks for key personnel, network segmentation, multi-factor authentication on all systems, and disclosure of any foreign ownership or influence in supply chains. Intelligence agencies should vet suppliers for any red flags.

8. Strengthen Legal Tools and Policies: Ensure the legal framework supports agile security operations. This includes having clear policies for drone interdiction (so that security forces can legally disable or shoot down unauthorized drones posing a threat), streamlined processes for international data sharing (align with privacy laws but don’t let bureaucracy stall urgent intel exchange), and temporary special measures like expedited immigration checks for security reasons. For cyber operations, authorities should have the legal clearance to take proactive action against servers or botnets targeting the events – possibly even offensive cyber measures to neutralize a major threat (with proper authorization).

9. Focus on Intelligence-Led Preventative Security: Use threat intelligence to drive early preventive actions. For example, if intel suggests a certain extremist group might target the event, use tools like travel visa screening and watchlist expansion to prevent potential perpetrators from entering the country. If cyber intel points to a ransomware gang targeting hotel or transit systems, engage with those sectors to raise shields and perhaps quietly pre-position law enforcement to intercept the gang’s activities.

10. Promote Resilience and Public Confidence: Finally, decision-makers should remember that a resilient mindset is part of security. Prepare to communicate effectively with the public in case of incidents – have messaging ready that guides people to safety and reassures them (to prevent panic or exploitation of chaos by adversaries). Build redundancy in fan engagement: if a service fails (say, a mobile app or a train line), have alternatives so that the event can continue safely. Demonstrating resilience – like the French did when cyberattacks hit but “no outages”occurred due to good. By making security everyone’s responsibility, the hosts can multiply their defensive capacity.

    
    

By implementing these recommendations, host nations and their partners can significantly bolster their readiness. The key is proactivity and unity – acting on intelligence before threats materialize and maintaining tight coordination among the myriad players involved. With the above measures, the major sporting events of 2026 can not only be a triumph of athletic achievement but also a showcase of effective international security collaboration, ensuring the safety of all and the true spirit of sport.